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Samuel Taylor-Alexander, Edward S. Dove, Isabel Fletcher,
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Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT
Biomedicine and the life sciences continuously rearrange the relationship
between culture and biology. In consequence, we increasingly look for a
suitable regulatory response to reduce perceived uncertainty and instability.
This article examines the full implications of this ‘regulatory turn’ by drawing
on the anthropological concept of liminality. We offer the term ‘regulatory
compression’ to characterise the effects of extant regulatory approaches on
health research practices. With its focus on transformation and the
‘in-between’, liminality allows us to see how regulatory frameworks rely on a
silo-based approach to classifying and regulating research objects such that
they: (1) limit the flexibility necessary in clinical and laboratory research; (2)
result in the emergence of unregulated spaces that lie between the bounded
regulatory spheres; and (3) curtail modes of public participation in the health
research enterprise. We suggest there is a need to develop the notion of
‘processual regulation’, a novel framework that requires a temporal-spatial
examination of regulatory spaces and practices as these are experienced by
all actors, including the relationship of actors with the objects of regulation.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 28 January 2016; Accepted 17 August 2016
KEYWORDS Health research; law; liminality; process; regulation
1. Introduction
Biomedicine and the life sciences continuously rearrange the relationship
between culture and biology. At times, the fields can both problematise
what it means to be human (consider, for example, xenotransplantation)
and also create uncertainty and instability in individual and public life (con-
sider, for example, the human tissue retention ‘scandal’ in the UK in the late
1990s). When this occurs, we often look for a suitable regulatory response to
reduce the uncertainty and instability by mitigating potential risks and harms
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and by directing or influencing actors’ behaviour to accord with socially
accepted norms and/or to promote desirable social outcomes. In this article,
we examine the full implications of this ‘regulatory turn’ – and in particular
the command-and-control model within the broad gamut of regulatory para-
digms that exists – by drawing on the anthropological concept of liminality.
Developed to make sense of ritual, structure, and agency, the notion of limin-
ality refers to a threshold phase characterised by uncertainty, possibility, mar-
ginality, and transformation. We argue that liminality can yield novel
insights into the nature of health research regulation, namely by (1) helping
us to better understand the profound sociotechnical challenges that continue
to redefine life, and (2) exploring alternative paths to governing the behaviour
of actors and enforcing norms across sites of authority in health research. In
doing so, we offer the notion of ‘regulatory compression’ to characterise the
effects of extant regulatory approaches on health research practices.
This article is divided into four sections. The first section claims that the
current mainstream apparatus of regulation fails to address adequately the full
array of socio-technical concerns in health research. Using the frame of
command-and-control regulation as a particularly acute instance of regulation
given effect through law, we posit that such responses often compress and dis-
locate the ‘feedback loops’ needed for robust and dynamic steering of behaviour,
thus stunting the development of flexible regulatory tools that can better address
health research. The second section focuses on the evolution of liminality, from
its original use to analyse ‘rites of passage’ to its development as a conceptual tool
for characterising and understanding contemporary practices. In drawing atten-
tion to questions of process, ‘anti-structure’ and other ontologies, scholars have
exposed the disruptive potential of liminality: the ‘noise’ generated in and across
liminal spaces requires various actors to systematically transform these putative
interferences into new forms of ‘inter-reference’ – that is, forms of understand-
ing that incorporate and go beyond disciplined ways of knowing the world. In
the last two sections, we reveal the potential significance of a liminal approach
to health research regulation by envisioning its application in areas such as
research ethics review and human embryo research as well as its application
to other kinds of actors, including things. We also investigate the space-time
metaphor of liminality and the notion of ‘social value’ in research. Finally, we
conclude with broader thoughts about how liminality enables us to reimagine
and reconceptualise the nature of health research regulation.
2. Regulatory compression
The metaphor of the ‘regulatory space’ is now well entrenched in academic
and everyday parlance,1 its modern origins being attributed to the seminal
1Frank Vibert, The New Regulatory Space: Reframing Democratic Governance (Edward Elgar, 2014).
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work of Hancher and Moran, who argued that in order to understand regu-
lation, attention must be paid to the physical places where regulation occurs.2
Morgan and Yeung have further suggested that two important implications
arise from this, namely, that (1) there is limited relevance of law and
formal authority within such spaces, and (2) multiple dynamics, including
history, culture, and organisational arrangements, will impact significantly
on regulatory dynamics.3 In terms of regulatory theory, multiple approaches
to creating regulatory spaces can be adopted, including rules-based regu-
lation,4 principles-based regulation,5 risk-based regulation,6 and archetypi-
cally, command-and-control regulation which sits at the extreme end of the
regulatory spectrum and is typified by the top-down imposition of standards
of conduct supported by the threat of criminal sanction.7 Thus, while being
something of a caricature of a regulatory approach, this last example can
nonetheless be illustrative of common dynamics that occur in regulatory
space. As such, it serves as a useful exemplar for the present discussion.
The main contention of this article is that liminality occurs in multiple
regulatory spaces and, moreover, that by recognising and acknowledging
this we can encourage a radical reimagining of those spaces by revealing
important processes that remain outside the purview of the traditional regu-
latory responses. To consider command-and-control in particular, such an
approach is characterised by what we call regulatory compression. While feed-
back loops – outputs of a regulatory system routed back as inputs to the
various actors implicated in the enterprise – exist between research and regu-
latory spaces,8 they are bound by the organisational structures in which they
arise. The temporal dimensions of health research regulation play a central
role in mediating the resolution of ontological issues (of what something
‘is’ that is to be regulated) and of democracy (how can we decide appropriate
and socially acceptable ways of regulating). When the regulatory space is
viewed this way, we can see the effects of respective regulatory approaches
in health research practices. For example, the materiality of regulatory
objects, such as a face for transplantation or an embryo in the laboratory,
2Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford University Press,
1989).
3Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
4Surendra Arjoon, ‘Striking a Balance Between Rules and Principles-based Approaches for Effective Gov-
ernance: A Risk-based Approach’ (2006) 68 Journal of Business Ethics 53.
5Nayha Sethi, ‘Reimagining Regulatory Approaches: On the Essential Role of Principles in Health Research
Regulation’ (2015) 12 SCRIPTed 91.
6Julia Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-based Regulation and the New Public Risk Management in the United
Kingdom’ [2005] Public Law 512.
7Robert Baldwin, ‘Regulation: After Command and Control’ in Keith Hawkins (ed), The Human Face of Law
(Oxford University Press, 1997) 65–84.
8Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Coproduction of Science and the Social Order (Routledge, 2004);
Jennifer Reardon, Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in the Age of Genomics (Princeton University
Press, 2004).
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changes throughout a given research protocol or experimental procedure.
However, regulation often fails to recognise the fluid nature of the objects
that it regulates, frequently forcing researchers to adapt their practices (and
the research objects themselves) to bring them into line with norms and
guidelines.
More acutely, in circumstances of genuinely disruptive change brought on
by rapid advances in technological development, and when this change threa-
tens established behaviours and working practices, such as smart devices or
autonomous vehicles, regulation can often be called upon to fill new regulat-
ory ‘gaps’ in a form of rapid response mode. Too often, however, this can
result in ill-conceived and foreshortened regulation that is scarcely fit for
purpose.9 Thus, regulatory compression speaks to the tendency for regulation
to promote a rigid, fractured, and sometimes top-down response to ethical,
epistemic, and ontological issues and to undervalue temporal and democratic
values. We see this, for example, in the demarcation of what counts as ‘tissue’,
‘organ’ or ‘data’ to accord with, e.g. the Human Tissue Act 2004 or Data Pro-
tection Act 1998 (not to mention with institutional regimes created to regulate
these ‘bounded objects’), even though everyday scientific practice suggests
there are many blurred boundaries between such materials. Thus, research
is done with tissue to produce data that reveal information that is interpreted
to reveal novel insights that lead to new knowledge about the world.
The language and reasoning central to the work of command-and-control
health research regulation has been criticised on two grounds. First, it fails to
achieve the appropriate distance from the objects of its analysis – a problem of
either regulatory capture or regulatory naïveté. For example, bioethics is a
critical component – a social movement and professional discipline – of
modern research regulation. Regulations around the world have sprung out
of the work derived from, inter alia, the World Medical Association and the
Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences.10 Yet bioethics
per se – a field that regulators rely on as an intermediary between research
and policymaking settings – is often divorced from the experiences of patients
and practitioners11 and too closely aligned to the practices that it seeks to
govern.12 Rather than being able to capture adequately the complexities of
9Contrast, Roger Brownsword, ‘In the Year 2061: From Law to Technological Management’ (2015) 7 Law,
Innovation and Technology 1.
10See World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013); Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects (CIOMS, 2002). See also Richard Ashcroft, ‘The Declaration in Helsinki’
in Ezekiel Emanuel and others (eds), The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics (Oxford University
Press, 2008) 141–48.
11Arthur Kleinman, Writing at the Margin: Discourse Between Anthropology and Medicine (University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1995); Paul Brodwin, ‘The Coproduction of Moral Discourse in US Community Psychiatry’
(2008) 22 Medical Anthropology Quarterly 127.
12Charles Rosenberg, ‘Meanings, Policies, and Medicine: On the Bioethical Enterprise and History’ (1999)
128 Daedalus 27; Carl Elliot, ‘Fear and Loathing in Bioethics’ (2016) 6 Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics 43.
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medical research, research participant experiences, and clinical life, bioethics
policy has been shown to play an integral part in the production of this com-
plexity and the shaping of corresponding responses to the scientific and moral
uncertainty that accompanies it.13 A central feature of these responses is the
production of new regulations that often contrast directly with the flexibility
and fluidity at play in the biosciences.14
The second critique of analytical distance suggests that questionable
research practices are institutionally mandated because regulatory reasoning
only allows certain questions to be asked.15 Alongside this are important
issues such as: the rights of individuals and communities that live in areas
with limited regulatory recourse, the nature and scope of the forms of protec-
tion they should receive, and how this protection can be fostered. As Kelleher
writes, despite the existence of a host of guidelines for conducting offshore
clinical trials, for example, there is a dearth of on-the-ground mechanisms
for protecting trial communities.16 Adding to these difficulties are the
modes of ‘strategic ignorance’17 that are tactically employed in research con-
texts to produce authority in the face of unsettling information that could
stymie scientific progress or result in liability or guilt in the aftermath of dele-
terious events. Consider, for example, the fallout following the Food and Drug
Administration’s licensing of Ketek, an antibiotic pharmaceutical that was
subsequently linked to liver failure. Analysis of the enquiry suggests ‘that in
drug regulation, different actors, from physicians to regulators to manufac-
turers, often battle over who can attest to the least knowledge of the efficacy
and safety of different drugs’.18
In sum, current command-and-control approaches to novel medical tech-
nologies have been criticised as undemocratic,19 temporally limited,20 unwa-
veringly supportive rather than critical of technological and scientific
trajectories,21 and generally burdensome and costly.22 We see at least three
13Brodwin (n 11).
14Samuel Taylor-Alexander, ‘Adjacent Temporalities: Making Medico-Scientific Futures and the Present’
(2015) 1 Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 67.
15J Benjamin Hurlbut, ‘Remembering the Future: Science, Law, and the Legacy of Asilomar’ in Sheila Jasan-
off (ed), Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (University of
Chicago Press, 2015) 126–51.
16Finnuala Kelleher, ‘The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical
Trials in Developing Nations’ (2004) 38 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 67.
17Linsey McGoey, ‘The Logic of Strategic Ignorance’ (2012) 63 The British Journal of Sociology 533.
18Ibid, 553.
19Sheila Jasanoff, Science and Public Reason (Routledge, 2012); Krishanu Saha and J Benjamin Hurlbut,
‘Treat Donors as Partners in Biobank Research’ (2011) 478 Nature 312.
20Paul Rabinow and Gaymon Bennett, Designing Human Practices: An Experiment With Synthetic Biology
(University of Chicago Press, 2012); Robin Williams, ‘Compressed Foresight and Narrative Bias: Pitfalls
In Assessing High Technology Futures’ (2006) 15 Science as Culture 327.
21Rosenberg (n 12); Elliot (n 12).
22Graeme Laurie and Shawn Harmon, ‘Through the Thicket and Across the Divide: Successfully Navigating
the Regulatory Landscape in Life Sciences Research’ in Emilie Cloatre and Martyn Pickersgill (eds), Knowl-
edge, Technology and Law (Routledge, 2014) 121–36.
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core effects, then, of regulatory compression: (1) a limiting of the flexibility (or
indeed serendipity) intrinsic to health research, which could both unduly
hinder research and disregard the interest of research participants; (2) a mar-
ginalisation of publics’ participation in health research projects or disregard of
their concerns; and (3) the emergence of unregulated spaces that lie between
the bounded regulatory spheres.
Building on the above critiques, a number of scholars have begun to outline
new approaches for engaging with health research regulation. As well as refi-
guring the temporal dimensions of oversight as a process that must be exam-
ined over its life course, these scholars stress the need to rethink the relation
between the different actors involved in research practices. Anthropologists
Paul Rabinow and Gaymon Bennet, for example, speak of ‘designing
human practices’ as an iterative and synergistic process aligning actors
from different disciplines in order to build responses to challenges from the
outset of research.23 Jane Kaye and colleagues write of ‘ELSI 2.0’ as a ‘colla-
borative’ enterprise with an epistemic and institutional architecture that
fosters novel forms of coordination and enables adequate responses to the
profound changes wrought by contemporary health research.24 However,
largely absent from these proposed models is substantive discussion of enga-
ging either with the diverse publics that unite around research, or with society
in general. The benefits of such engagement have been outlined elsewhere,
and developed through such notions as ‘partnership’25 and ‘solidarity’.26
While these latter works speak directly to the democratic limits of any
current command-and-control approach, we argue here that a processual
approach to health research, grounded in liminality, suggests they need to
be coupled with models that promote iterative and flexible regulation and cri-
tiques of the broader political purpose implicit in research regulation.
3. Liminality: its development and its potential
The concept of liminality offers a unique purview to (re)consider extant
approaches to health research regulation. In this section, we stress the need
to move away from a tendency of some of the liminality literature to
employ the word as a synonym for something or someone that occupies a
‘marginal’ space. When viewed in the context of health research regulation,
these liminal spaces do not occupy the periphery. On the contrary, our analy-
sis shows that liminality is central to the everyday research practices and the
regulatory mechanisms that surround them.
23Rabinow and Bennett (n 20).
24Jane Kaye and others, ‘ELSI 2.0 for Genomics and Society’ (2012) 336 Science 673.
25Saha and Hurlbut (n 19).
26Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics (Nuffield
Council on Bioethics, 2011).
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Liminality challenges us to engage with the processual and experiential
dynamics of research, including the ways in which practices, people, and enti-
ties are affected by regulation. This focus on process and experience emerged
originally in the French anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep’s ethnographic
research of ritual practices.27 Seeking to understand social transformation,
Van Gennep identified ‘liminal rites’ as a critical component of the reproduc-
tion of social order, positing a tripartite model that outlined: (1) the symbolic
and spatial separation of an individual from their existing social position (pre-
liminal); (2) the transformation of their social status as they pass through an
adjacent, often marginal space characterised by a dissolution of established
social order and hierarchy (liminal); and (3) their spatial and symbolic rein-
corporation into society (post-liminal). Because the suspension of social order
is spatially and temporally limited, such ritual practice allows for social trans-
formation to occur in a manner that preserves broader organisational
structures.
Building on this interpretation of ritual practices, in the mid-twentieth
century, the British-born anthropologist Victor Turner moved attention to
liminal experiences in non-ritual societies. His work suggests that it is
through liminality that we see and experience the most basic elements of
common humanity. In his seminal work, Turner examined the role of limin-
ality in ritual performances, such as initiation rites, describing the transforma-
tive dimensions of liminal experience while noting that such performances
are often evocative and revealing of a society’s underlying structure and
values.28 According to Turner: ‘Liminal entities are neither here nor there;
they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law,
custom, convention, and ceremony’;29 liminality ‘may partly be described as
a stage of reflection’.30 For Turner, liminality is an ‘inter-structural situation’
that involves a coincidence of opposite symbols: ‘This coincidence of opposite
processes and notions in a single representative characterizes the peculiar
unity of the liminal: that which is neither this nor that, and yet is both.’31
Because it accompanies the dissolution of social order and established
hierarchies, the liminal time-space can be regarded as a nexus for transform-
ation and reflection. That is, engaging with process and change helps reveal
existing social structures and ordering practices. Moreover, as Thomassen
writes, while liminality is a central component of modernity it should be
used to examine, rather than to explain, social phenomena. In doing so,
‘liminality opens the door to a world of contingency where events and mean-
ings – indeed “reality” itself – can be moulded and carried in different
27Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (University of Chicago Press, 2011[1909]).
28Victor Turner, Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Cornell University Press, 1969).
29Ibid, 95.
30Ibid, 240.
31Ibid, 7.
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directions’.32 In offering such terms as ‘permanent liminality’33 and ‘liminal
hotspots’,34 recent writings in the field draw attention to the role of fluidity,
flux, and epistemic interference in the constitution of everyday life as ‘once
previous certainties are removed and one enters a delicate, uncertain, malle-
able state’.35
Susan Squier echoes Turner’s account of the transformation-reflection
nexus in her writing on excess embryos and other objects that occupy the
limen of human and non-human. She bridges writing on liminality with
Paul Rabinow’s concept of ‘purgatory’, which she views as ‘a specific kind
of liminality or in-betweenness’.36 For Rabinow, this purgatory is character-
ised by:
a chronic sense that the future is at stake; a leitmotif among scientists, intellec-
tuals, and sectors of the public turning on redeeming past moral errors and
avoiding future ones; an awareness of an urgent need to focus on a vast zone
of ambiguity and shading in judging actions and actors conduct; a heightened
sense of tension between this-worldly activities and (somehow) transcendent
states and values; and a pressing need to define a mode of relationship to
these issues.37
In uniting Turner’s articulation of liminality as a state of transformation
with Rabinow’s diagnosis of the contemporary, Squier elicits what she views
as an inherent relationship between possibility and responsibility in contem-
porary health research. The ontological status of novel entities often promotes
a form of reflection and scrutiny in which ‘the near future and recent past’38 is
called into play. Attention to the liminal thus helps reveal the inherent relation
between knowledge, be(com)ing, and social order.
Scholarship has also explored how techno-medically mediated liminal sub-
jectivities unsettle established moral and medico-political orders and become
the catalysts for the revision of corollary modes of practice.39 Others from
social studies of science and medicine have demonstrated an intra-relation-
ship between episteme and ontos, which has required a rethinking of the
classic human/non-human distinction. Revealing the interactive feedback
loops between modes of knowing and objects of analysis in clinical and
32Bjorn Thomassen, Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between (Ashgate, 2014) 7.
33Árpád Szakolczai, ‘Liminality and Experience: Structuring Transitory Situations and Transformative
Events’ (2009) 2 International Political Anthropology 141.
34Paul Stenner, ‘Liminality: Un-Wohl-Gefühle und der affective turn’ in Elisabeth Mixa and others (eds), Un-
Wohl-Gefühle: Eine Kulturanalyse gegenwärtiger Befindlichkeiten (transcript Verlag, 2016) 45–68.
35Szakolczai (n 33) 172.
36Susan Merrill Squier, Liminal Lives: Imagining the Human at the Frontiers of Biomedicine (Duke University
Press, 2004) 8.
37Paul Rabinow, French DNA: Trouble in Purgatory (University of Chicago Press, 1999) 17–18.
38Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today (Princeton University Press, 2003) 55.
39Robert Barrett, ‘The “Schizophrenic” and the Liminal Persona in Modern Society’ (1998) 22 Culture, Medi-
cine and Psychiatry 465; Jean Jackson, ‘Stigma, Liminality, and Chronic Pain: Mind-Body Borderlands’
(2005) 32 American Ethnologist 332; Squier (n 36).
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laboratory settings, this literature has focused on how physical matter, and by
extension human experience, is transformed through established and nascent
epistemic practices.40 When viewed through the lens of liminality, we might
say that such betwixt and between beings threaten ‘the epistemologically
neutral status of nature and its rigorous separation from society’.41 They do
so by bringing into relief the processes of ‘purification’42 that separate
nature from culture, normal from abnormal, living from dead. Consider,
for example, the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on the delineation
of new diagnostic categories of ‘abnormal populations’ in psychiatry,43 and
the emergence of new questions as to what counts as ‘brain dead’ that accom-
pany novel technological developments.44 Alongside this body of literature,
we find especially useful writing on the entwined constitution of natural
and socio-political orders, on how the relation between is and ought is
mediated by knowledge practices,45 which allows us to ask: why/how are
some onto-epistemologies promoted over others?
To summarise three core insights discussed above: liminality posits
(1) social and ontological transformation as structuring and structured pro-
cesses and experiences that occur in institutionally delineated time-spaces;
(2) that these processes are central to the reproduction and maintenance of
established organisational forms, which are otherwise threatened by liminal
beings (e.g. human embryos and brain dead patients) because they reveal
the constructed nature of our own being; and (3) in doing so, attention to
liminality opens up new avenues for thinking about how the relationship
between knowing and being in health research, and corollary experiences,
are configured vis-à-vis the reproduction of extant social structures.
In contrast to the academic literature that conflates liminality with the
marginal, this reading moves liminality into the centre of social and political
life. It is inherent to social and political transformation – and as such, carries
significant implications for regulatory design. Liminality suggests the need for
a processual-oriented mode of regulation (not to be confused with processes
per se) that:
40Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and
Meaning (Duke University Press, 2007); Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice
(Duke University Press, 2002); Charis Thompson, Making Parents: The Ontological Choreography of Repro-
ductive Technologies (MIT Press, 2005); Steve Woolgar and Javier Lezaun, ‘The Wrong Bin Bag: A Turn to
Ontology in Science and Technology Studies?’ (2013) 43 Social Studies of Science 321.
41Margaret Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death (University of California Press,
2002) 41.
42Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard University Press, 1993).
43Allan Young, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton University
Press, 1997); Andrew Lakoff, Pharmaceutical Reason: Knowledge and Value in Global Psychiatry (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005).
44Lock (n 41); Squier (n 36).
45Jasanoff (n 8); Reardon (n 8).
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. Over time, recognises the flexibility and fluidity inherent to laboratory and
clinical research;
. In space, focuses on iterative interactions that adapt with new developments
in science and medicine, as well as with changes in law and regulation; and
. Through experience, reflects the complete investigative endeavour and is
able, for example, to guide the different involved parties through the
entire research process.
We now turn to explore the potential significance of a liminal approach to
health research regulation by envisioning its application to specific areas of
health research, as well as its application to other kinds of actors.
4. Liminal ontologies
4.1. From the liminality of people to the liminality of things
Traditionally, liminality has been applied narrowly to people, both as individ-
uals and communities. Though we have noted its evolution from a concept
applied to ethnographic studies of ritual passages to an explanatory social
theory of the modern, the species to which it applies has remained anthropo-
logical. The liminality scholar Bjorn Thomassen remarks that liminality refers
to ‘how human beings experience and react to change’46 and that ‘experiences
of liminality can be related to three different types of subjecthood: 1) single
individuals; 2) social groups (e.g. cohorts, minorities); and 3) whole societies,
entire populations, civilizations.’47
While Thomassen suggests that these types are broad – opening up space
for possible uses beyond van Gennep’s and Turner’s understandings – in fact,
this typology is rather limiting, especially when we observe how much of
health research regulation focuses on objects – tissue, data, embryos, genes,
and so on – rather than on the persons to whom these objects relate. Thomas-
sen’s typology fails to account for the full tapestry of participants – both as
subjects and objects – in social settings and relations, and recent develop-
ments in linking anthropology with social theory. Expanding on Squier’s con-
tention that supernumerary embryos from artificial reproduction
technologies represent ‘liminal lives’,48 and taking up Bruno Latour’s call to
consider all participants at play in a social setting,49 we claim that liminality
is not ‘merely’ a transitional, in-between state that applies to people or argu-
ably hybrid entities like embryos or stem cells. Rather, liminality can also
account for the changing relations that people have with the world and the
46Thomassen (n 32) 1.
47Ibid, 89.
48Squier (n 36).
49Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to ActorNetworkTheory (Oxford University Press,
2005).
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things around them. In this sense, liminality can be applied as well to things.
Things are also capable of ‘passing through’ periods or epochs of transition,
leading to novel assemblages or reassemblages of understanding, behaviour,
and connections to people. The paradox is that while liminality has failed
hitherto to account for things, regulation all too often fails to account for
experiences of subjects in relation to things, particularly research participants,
in its drive to create regulatory objects for the purposes of the regulatory
enterprise itself.
We can consider the relationship between the liminality of persons and
things by observing what happens to the research protocol and attendant
forms that health researchers must, under regulation, complete, and submit
to multiple bodies (e.g. research ethics committees, funders, sponsors, R&D
offices) when seeking approbation to commence a research project. Health
research is coloured as much by researchers and other human actors as it is
by the paperwork that drives the movement from the initial spark of a
research question to the culmination in research performance and interpret-
ation of results. The submitted research protocol and attendant forms are
printed, stapled, folded, scanned and copied, mailed or emailed, analysed,
and ruled on by authority figures who act to both adjudicate but also potentially
help guide researchers through the uncertain terrain of research. At multiple
instances, there can be impediments and periods of uncertainty. A form may
be incomplete or inaccurate, the research design may be deemed too risky
for participants, or the resources necessary to conduct the research are
lacking. Can we not say that these documents or devices go through multiple
transitory passages and transformations, marked by both uncertainty and the
guiding (or editing) hand of a gatekeeper or steward to lead it through the
passage(s) towards approbation? Liminality invokes the notion of a ‘master
of ceremonies’ or ‘representative of order’ who helps guide a person through
a period of transformation. In the research context, we see the importance of
these regulatory actors in guiding these things through the liminal phase and
out the other side, resolving potential crises at any moment, but also invoking
their ordained power to rule on the merit of the research application’s – and not
necessarily the researcher’s – social or scientific value.
One might ask how it is possible, though, for a thing to go through uncer-
tainties of the in-between. Can a thing pass ‘through’? We would respond
affirmatively by drawing attention to the critical function research protocols
and attendant forms – and the regulation thereof – play in health research.
Latour remarks that:
if we stick to our decision to start from the controversies about actors and
agencies, then any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a differ-
ence is an actor – of, if it has no figuration yet, an actant.50
50Ibid, 71.
LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 11
He further notes that this is not:
the empty claim that objects do things ‘instead’ of human actors: it simply says
that no science of the social can even begin if the question of who and what par-
ticipates in the action is not first of all thoroughly explored, even though it
might mean letting elements in which, for lack of a better term, we would
call non-humans.51
This claim that regulation often fails to appreciate the relationship between
the liminality of persons and things, and that things can go through uncertain-
ties of the in-between, is further evidenced by considering instances of contri-
buting of one’s ‘personal data’ or ‘human tissue’ for research purposes. Both
data and tissue, as we have said, are treated as ‘bounded objects’ regulated in a
country like the UK by the Data Protection Act 1998 and Human Tissue Act
2004 (and Scotland’s equivalent), respectively. By ‘bounded object’ we mean
things that are regulated based on whether they fall within a specific definition
(in law, policy, guideline, etc., as ‘personal data’ for the Data Protection Act
199852 and ‘relevant material’ for the Human Tissue Act 200453), and if so,
are subject to a specific corpus of rules and standards. According to both
Acts, the personal data and human tissue connected to a research participant
can fall outwith each statute’s regulatory regime provided that the data or
tissue are anonymised (and in the case of the Human Tissue Act 2004, the
research is approved by a research ethics committee). In other words, research
conducted using data or tissue can be done without having to comply with
numerous regulatory rules if the data or tissue are anonymised in such a
way that the researcher is not in possession, and not likely to come into pos-
session, of information that could identify the participant to whom those data
or tissue otherwise appertain.
This may be satisfactory from a researcher’s perspective in foregoing
‘research red tape’ or otherwise burdensome procedures. Anonymisation
has come to be a powerful tool in the researcher’s arsenal of ensuring
smooth sailing through troubled regulatory waters. But from another perspec-
tive, anonymisation permitted under these regulatory regimes reflects an
instance of regulatory compression in two ways. First, it fails to account for
the ongoing promotion of the participant’s interests in the things that have
been physically removed from them or contributed by them, yet still may
have fundamental value to them (and that can change over time). For
example, a participant might feel very aggrieved that ‘their’ data or tissue
was used to support tobacco research even if ‘their’ data or tissue retained
no linkable connection to them. By breaking (often permanently) the connec-
tion between a participant and his or her tissue or data, regulation can
51Ibid, 72.
52Data Protection Act 1998, s 1(1).
53Human Tissue Act 2004, s 53.
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encourage uncertainty and anxiety – if not a ‘permanent liminality’54 – about
the passages of these objects across sites and stages in various research pro-
jects. Anonymisation may ‘promise’ a participant privacy and security of
their data and tissue (though this is a questionable promise), but it cannot
promise promotion of other interests such as meaningful engagement or
ongoing communication with the participant about what outcomes (research,
health, or otherwise) arise from the research conducted using their data or
tissue.
Second, regulatory instantiation of anonymisation reflects both an overly
rigid approach to a technological process and a fallacious belief that the
process is an adequate means to avoid a heightened degree of regulatory scru-
tiny. It is well established in the literature that anonymisation is a process per-
formed on an object to remove its identifiability, but that as a process, it is
contingent and relative, meaning it can also change over time.55 Indeed, anon-
ymisation has received much scrutiny recently as a means of adequately ‘de-
identifying’ genomic information. Increasingly, we have come to realise how
much genomic information is re-identifiable no matter what the processes
performed on them to remove traces of identifiability.56 However robust an
anonymisation practice exists today, tomorrow it may be exposed as a
broken promise of privacy.57 Further, there is a point at which anonymisation
becomes so intense a process – a kind of race to scrub as many identifiers as
possible to wipe clean all trace of connection to a person – that it renders the
putatively anonymised object valueless for research.58 Thus, anonymising
data or tissue, though regarded highly in health research regulation as a
means to avoid bureaucratic scrutiny, does not absolve researchers from their
legal obligations for all time coming, nor does it absolve them from ethical obli-
gations. As anonymisation is a process and not a status, it impels researchers
and regulators alike to consider how uses of these objects, even if apparently
‘disconnected’ from the participant-subject hic et nunc, may yet impact on
the interests or sensibilities of them and their connected others (e.g. family
and community members) over time. In this way we can contrast the technical
process of anonymisation with the processual perspective that liminality pro-
vides. Regulation does not provide guidance about what to do here. It is true
54Szakolczai (n 33).
55Deryck Beyleveld and David Townend, ‘When is Personal Data Rendered Anonymous? Interpreting
Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC’ (2004) 6 Medical Law International 73; Nayha Sethi and Graeme
Laurie, ‘Delivering Proportionate Governance in the Era of eHealth: Making Linkage and Privacy Work
Together’ (2013) 13 Medical Law International 168.
56Yaniv Erlich and Arvind Narayanan, ‘Routes for Breaching and Protecting Genetic Privacy’ (2014) 15
Nature Reviews Genetics 409; Melissa Gymrek and others, ‘Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname
Inference’ (2013) 339 Science 321.
57Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization’ (2010) 57
UCLA Law Review 1701.
58Council of Canadian Academies, Accessing Health and Health-Related Data in Canada (Council of Cana-
dian Academies, 2015).
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that it permits certain uses of anonymised objects, but it fails to guide us
sufficiently on how they should be used; moreover, it fails to reflect fully the
fluidity of the regulatory object – (personal)(anonymised)(personal etc.) data
– over time.
In contrast, it is worth noting that the US has recently proposed in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to amend its federal Common
Rule, which governs federally funded human subjects research, to expand
the regulation’s definition of ‘human subject’ to include the obtaining, use,
study, or analysis of biospecimens, regardless of identifiability.59 Phrased
another way, biospecimens would be considered human subjects. This
would bring secondary research use (i.e. use of specimens initially collected
for purposes other than the currently proposed research activity) of non-ident-
ified biospecimens collected in either research or non-research settings within
the purview of the Common Rule. As biospecimens would be considered
human subjects, the NPRM proposes requiring informed consent for the
storage and secondary research use of biospecimens, though this consent
would be ‘broad’. The expressed purpose of this revision is to protect the par-
ticipant’s autonomy (in other words, to let them decide whether to consent to
have their biospecimens used in research) in light of risks of re-identification
and possible dignitary harms, and to allow participants to have some control
over future research with biological materials collected from them.
Viewed through the lens of liminality, we see this specific NPRM proposal
as a positive and all-too-rare regulatory recognition of the need to recognise
the fluid but bounded nature of the connection between subject with object,
and to promote the participants’ interests when they contribute to the
research endeavour – and which may well change over time and across
various types of projects. It remains the case that secondary research use of
non-identifiable (i.e. anonymised) personal data would not require consent
under the Common Rule, as ‘personal data’ are not considered to be (as of
yet) ‘human subjects’. This regulatory distinction between physical material
and data with respect to autonomy interests and consent is questionable,
yet the proposed change to include biospecimens as human subjects is a
step forward. Far from reflecting semantic gymnastics (‘Biospecimens are
human subjects? Impossible!’), the NPRM is instantiating a liminal reading
of inseparable bond between participants and the things of theirs that they
give – but not always give away – in the interests of research.
What we learn for these two examples, then, is that things – objects – in
health research do not necessarily cause a state of affairs – such as transform-
ations of people or events to happen (though they certainly can do so), but nor
are these things inactive entities – mere passive objects – devoid of
59United States Department of Health, ‘NPRM for Revisions to the Common Rule’ (8 September 2015)
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/regulations/nprmhome.html (accessed 26 January 2016).
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significance themselves in understanding networks of relations and assem-
blages. By recognising the liminality of things and their relation to partici-
pant-subjects, we come to appreciate the metaphysical shades and
kaleidoscopic array of actors – active subject-objects – in health research
(including these non-humans). We also come to appreciate how forms and
other documents in health research can pass through multiple moments of
transition and formation, and through their text, structure, and invocation,
form a constitutive part of regulation and the processes associated with
health research, be it through ethics review, requests for data access or
linkage, or R&D approval from NHS bodies.
In sum, a liminality of things helps us understand how regulation and its
constituent elements are part of the list of figures assembled as ‘participants’
in the research enterprise and act as a durable whole throughout processes of
transition and uncertainty. Tissue and data unite with the embodied partici-
pant as One. A liminality of things thus enables us to recognise the connec-
tions between regulatory objects and the human subjects from whom they
are derived, and between regulatory devices (such as anonymisation and
consent) and the human subjects that modify their state of affairs. Less posi-
tively, it can demonstrate how compressed regulation centres on ‘bounded
objects’ and disregards the transformations and transforming expectations
and interests of these active subject-objects. We come to recognise, then,
how many more actors and subjectivities are in play in the course of any
given health research project, irrespective of whether regulation recognises
this. And indeed, it often does not, as the processual case of the human
embryo makes even more clear.
4.2. A processual case: the human embryo
The UK’s regulatory approach to human embryos is one way in which we
might highlight that the law regulates on the basis of several underlying scien-
tific and ethical assumptions. Normatively, the moral status of the human
embryo is viewed in the singular, especially by law. This is not an adequate
reflection of biological reality. Gaps exist between the regulatory categories
that the law has created, such as between gamete and embryo; embryo and
foetus; and foetus and baby. Moreover, even though law attempts to clarify
these categories of being, the lines remain blurred as demonstrated by
ongoing debates, for example, concerning embryonic stem cell research or
time-limits on abortion. Yet biological growth of the embryo, from con-
ception, is manifestly a continuous process not a set of several ‘levels’ of
being, as the law attempts to prescribe. To what extent, then, is it the law’s
place to ‘handle’ or ‘remedy’ the ethical questions that surround the human
embryo, when the underlying assumptions upon which the legal edifice is
built are not concrete?
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The concept of liminality once again provides useful insight here. Let us
consider the link between liminality, the embryo, and morality. The moral
status that we afford the embryo informs the law, and the ways in which
we represent biology in law have an important effect on the role we, as a
society, afford to biology. Arguably, morality and law currently depict ‘the
embryo’ as a unitary entity. Is there any other manner in which we could
view ‘the embryo’, and if there is, what are the consequences of doing so?
Regulation of the embryo in the UK, under the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990 (as amended), embodies the ‘compromise pos-
ition’, as recommended by the Warnock Committee. This position has been
described as affording ‘respect’ for the human embryo.60 While this position
does not give the embryo a ‘lower’ moral status equivalent to that which we
afford to human tissue or other products of the human body, it is also not
afforded personhood:
the compromise position is not concerned to protect individual human
embryos, since these will ultimately be destroyed, but is instead directing
towards protecting the symbolic value of early human life.61
In this way, the compromise position seems to recognise the embryo’s transi-
tional state, from cell(s), to human being (or ‘person’).62 Yet, although the
compromise position embraces the embryo’s liminal state to some extent, it
does not do so fully. Despite governing two potentially distinct processual
pathways on which the embryo might ﬁnd itself – namely, reproduction or
research – the HFE Act 1990 (as amended) covers these two contexts
within the same piece of regulation.
Embryo regulation is a form of static, hard law, and the question of the
status of the embryo – as laid down by Warnock – has not been revisited
since the creation of the original HFE Act in 1990. Even the debacle over
cloned embryos was effectively shut down by the House of Lords in 2005 in
Quintavalle.63 This is arguably an example where potential for new, more
public input into the regulation of embryos has been blocked, thus maintain-
ing the rigidity and inflexibility of one of the core focuses of the HFE Act, viz.,
the status of the embryo. Accordingly, there is little in the way of substantive
feedback loops,64 and the statute itself is quite inflexible in this regard.
Although there are, quite commendably, regular consultations on certain pro-
posed incremental amendments to the Act (for example on mitochondrial
60Although later, Baroness Warnock pointed out that one cannot ‘respect’ something you ‘throw away’, so
she instead suggested that it embodies the principle of ‘non-frivolity’.
61Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2013) 638.
62Squier (n 36).
63R v S of S for Health ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) [2003] 2 WLR 692 House of Lords.
64As aforementioned, ‘feedback loops’ are outputs of a regulatory system routed back as inputs to the
various actors implicated in the enterprise.
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replacement therapy in 2014 leading to 2015 Regulations),65 there is little
other outlook for this fundamental issue to be addressed, and it is certainly
not done so in these consultations. The issue at hand here is, therefore, that
the status of the embryo has been made entirely inflexible by the law.
There are at least two reasons why regulating the embryo through static,
hard law is problematic. First, scientific understandings, and ethical attitudes
towards them, are ever-evolving. Second, as aforementioned, the evolution
from gamete, to embryo, to foetus, to child is itself processual (and not a
set of entirely separable ‘stages’). Thus, embryos are regulated in an inflexible
manner not only in terms of the lack of statutory re-visitation, but also in
terms of the static, and stage-like manner in which the law tends to
segment this biological reality. Once again, regulation creates a series of
‘bounded objects’ to be the subject of its attention.
For humanities scholar Susan Merrill Squier, mentioned above, current
embryonic stem cell research has created ‘a liminal space in which the
meaning and value of the human embryo is in flux’.66 Science has enabled
us to see biological processes more clearly than ever. Nonetheless, this
increased knowledge and scrutiny has come paired with an increased scienti-
fic awareness of the different ‘uses’ that human embryos may have:
Human embryos are no longer defined only as those things that become
human; now, human embryos have the potential to become other things,
such as research subjects, stem cell repositories, and facilitators of therapeutic
cloning research. Their value is increased by their enhanced utility. For Squier,
biotechnical innovations and their accompanying discursive constructions alter
the liminal space in which science and human bodies interact. The liminal
space can be seen as a field of knowledge production where the contestation
of claims happens in numerous ways… .67
65See e.g. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ‘Mitochondria Replacement Consultation:
Advice To Government’ (2013) www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Mitochondria_replacement_consultation_-_
advice_for_Government.pdf; Nuffield Bioethics, ‘Draft Regulations On Mitochondrial Replacement Tech-
niques Echo Council Recommendations: Nuffield Bioethics’ (2014) www.nuffieldbioethics.org/news/
draft-regulations-mitochondrial-replacement-techniques-echo-council-recommendations; Nuffield
Council on Bioethics, ‘Novel Techniques For The Prevention Of Mitochondrial DNA Disorders: An
Ethical Review’ (2012) www.nuffieldbioethics.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/Novel_techniques_for_
the_prevention_of_mitochondrial_DNA_disorders_compressed.pdf?; Department of Health, ‘Mitochon-
drial Donation: A Consultation On Draft Regulations To Permit The Use Of New Treatment Techniques To
Prevent The Transmission Of A Serious Mitochondrial Disease From Mother To Child’ (2014) www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285251/mitochondrial_donation_
consultation_document_24_02_14_Accessible_V0.4.pdf; Department of Health, ‘Mitochondrial
Donation: Government Response To The Consultation On Draft Regulations To Permit The Use Of
New Treatment Techniques To Prevent The Transmission Of A Serious Mitochondrial Disease From
Mother To Child’ (2014) www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
332881/Consultation_response.pdf (all accessed 26 January 2016).
66Mary Ingram-Waters, Unnatural Babies: Cultural Conceptions of Deviant Procreations (University of Califor-
nia, PhD thesis, 2008) 75.
67Ibid.
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Thus, the transitional state that the embryo occupies is not invariant;
indeed it may be subject to (at least) two outcomes: reproductive purposes,
and research purposes. Interestingly, Devaney refers to the ‘dual reproductive
identity’ of the embryo:
Thus, at the point embryo progenitors make their decision, their intention
helps to shape the embryo’s legal status, indicating the context within which
its value (whether reproductive, therapeutic or other) should be determined.
This has been termed the ‘dual reproductive identity’ of embryos consisting
of past attempts to conceive a child and the future capacity of science to trans-
form the vital power of individual cells into colonies of regenerative cells.68
The embryo itself is a liminal entity, aside from the liminal states that the law
has created for it by delineating categories of being. It is an entity in an ongoing
process of ‘becoming’. Moreover, the transitory state of the embryo has been
recognised in other cultures, for example in mizuko kuyō, a Japanese tradition
for grieving miscarriages that recognises liminality in embryonic life.69 By virtue
of this process of becoming, it makes little sense to categorise it as a singular
entity. Moreover, not only does the ontology of the embryo change as it
moves into different time-spaces, but it is also important to recognise that
the ability to engage with the therapeutic possibilities of the embryo for research
is dependent on seeing it as a fluid entity that is co-produced at the intersection
of regulation, biology, and laboratory approaches technologies. The embryo as a
resource for hESC research, for example, ‘is defined by its being “not yet” some-
thing else, that is a stem cell is defined more in terms of a biological possibility –
its pluripotency – than a well-defined actuality’.70
The obvious next question, however, is So What? For one thing, the failure
of law to reflect these realities is yet another instance of regulatory com-
pression and potentially sub-optimal operation of the regulatory infrastruc-
ture itself. Beyond this, there is also, arguably, a third state, described
below, that embryos occupy at a certain point in time, perhaps even more
liminal than the latter two. This is the embryo with an unknown future.
Thus, at least three liminal states of the embryo may be said to exist:
(1) Where the embryo is to be used for reproductive purposes.
(2) Where it is going to be used in research.
(3) Where it has an uncertain future, e.g. when being used for PGD, its future
could be either state 1 or 2. This reflects Turner’s description of a state of
‘pure possibility’.71
68Sarah Devaney, Stem Cell Research and the Collaborative Regulation of Innovation (Routledge, 2013) 15–
16.
69Elizabeth Harrison, ‘Women’s Responses to Child Loss in Japan: The Case of mizuko kuyō’ (1995) 11
Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 67.
70Andrew Webster and Lena Eriksson, ‘Governance-by-Standards in the Field of Stem Cells: Managing
Uncertainty in the World of “Basic Innovation”’ (2008) 27 New Genetics and Society 99, 105.
71Turner (n 28).
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Liminality thus makes evident the ontological questions related to the
moral status of the embryo, and, following on from this, issues with regulating
the embryo as a singular object. Moreover, liminality is not only relevant here
in terms of the embryo’s ‘in-between’ state, but also by virtue of it being an
entity in a process of becoming. This has implications on multiple levels, for
example embryos, donors, and parents, to name a few. Pertinent to this
context, the liminal quality of embryos has the potential to greatly influence
scientific researchers. A study by Svendsen and Koch challenges the idea
that ‘spare’ embryos are a biological fact, and rather are constituted by the
decision-making of researchers.72 This ‘ongoing fact-making’ reveals a
network of relationships and conflicts in which researchers are involved
and through which the embryo passes and is variously assembled and
disassembled.
What this entity is becoming, is, as aforementioned, variable. This outcome
is of course largely at the whim of external actors in this context (with the
notable exception that in the context of ‘natural reproduction’ the different
outcomes of the embryo may also be affected by biological factors not in
control of the mother, or others).73 The notion of subject and object is
once again important here. Where the embryo is given a ‘human’ path (as
a consequence of occupying state 1), its treatment as a subject, rather than
as an object, could be said to intensify.74 Conversely, where the embryo
occupies state 2, they are arguably ‘dehumanised’. The treatment of the
embryo as a subject or object under law (or perhaps on a scale from subject
to object) becomes clearer when embryos are separated into the three
liminal states listed above. However, as with our earlier subject-object discus-
sion relating to ‘personal data’ and ‘human tissue’, our analysis on the liminal
statuses of the embryo – on any path – suggests that connections with subjects
already enjoying full personhood, namely the biological creators of the
embryo, ought not to be too easily or quickly severed.
The three states identified herein are problematic for the status of ‘the
embryo’ under law. This analysis suggests that there are good reasons to
explore more fully whether it is sustainable to continue to regulate as if
there was a unitary entity. Liminality has great disruptive potential in this
area in its capability to highlight the static (and false) scientific and ethical
assumptions that the law embodies when regulating the human embryo.
72Mette Svendsen and Lene Koch, ‘Unpacking the “Spare Embryo”: Facilitating Stem Cell Research in a
Moral Landscape’ (2008) 38 Social Studies of Science 93.
73In highlighting the impact of hESC materiality on research practice, for example, Eriksson and Webster
write: ‘In public domains, hESCs tended to be described as comparatively stable and compliant entities
… Technicians would testify that the private stem cell was of a different disposition entirely – difficult to
maintain it in an undifferentiated state, let alone to push it down specific developmental trajectories’:
Lena Eriksson and Andrew Webster, ‘Standardizing Work as a Recursive Process: Shaping the Embryonic
Stem Cell Field’ (2015) 34 New Genetics and Society 72 at 76.
74For example, under the Abortion Act.
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Liminality forces us to recognise the differences in status that the embryo may
experience depending on the paths upon which it is put. With changeable
contexts come fluid boundaries. In particular, liminal boundaries are fluid
because contexts can change. As stated above, an embryo used in PGD
might be used for research or be used for reproduction. The definitions
that we use for differing stages of the embryonic process, and the different
contexts that apply to those, are themselves open to change. Furthermore,
‘embryo’ is a temporal-based definition; it describes an entity’s place in a
moment and within a process. Thus the fluidity shown here exemplifies yet
another kind of liminality: it is a liminality itself defined by the embryo
being suspended in a threshold or particular space in time: a space of
uncertainty.
The liminal states and the subject/object dyad are important for the future
of artificial reproduction and embryo research because the notion of ‘the
moral status of the embryo’ underpins the entire legal architecture of
human reproductive regulation. A liminal perspective suggests, however,
that at best, the law may be perpetuating a moral myth, and at worst, the com-
pressed regulatory regime is fundamentally flawed.
5. Thresholds and spaces in time
5.1. Liminality as a spatial metaphor
The case study of the embryo demonstrates the ways in which liminality can
be used to analyse processual elements in the definition of biological entities.
However, as Van Gennep’s initial formulation describes processes of change
in space and time,75 another way of thinking about liminality is to focus on the
spatial and temporal aspects of the processes under consideration. This
section will discuss ways of using spatial approaches in our thinking about
health research regulation.
One way of achieving this is to consider how liminality might be combined
with approaches from Science and Technology Studies (STS) that use geo-
graphic and cartographic metaphors. Canonical examples of such approaches
include ‘boundary objects’,76 ‘boundary work’,77 ‘situated knowledge’,78
‘standpoints’,79 and ‘trading zones’.80 In the rest of this section, we will
75Van Gennep (n 27).
76Susan Leigh Star and James Griesemer, ‘Institutional Ecology, “Translations”, and Boundary Objects:
Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology’ (1989) 19 Social Studies of
Science 387.
77Thomas Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science (University of Chicago Press, 1999).
78Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse: Feminism and
Technoscience (Routledge, 1997).
79Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (The Open University Press, 1986).
80Peter Galison, ‘Trading Zone: Coordinating Action and Belief’ in Mario Biagioli (ed), The Science Studies
Reader (Routledge, 1999) 137–60.
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consider two such conceptual metaphors, boundary objects81 and boundary
work, as they have been very influential, inter alia, due to their use to under-
stand processes of regulation. Both of these approaches rely on ideas of inter-
pretative flexibility, i.e. that objects and ideas can have multiple uses and/or
meanings depending on the social context in which they are used.82 We
will argue that, in combination with ideas about liminality, these spatial
approaches provide clearer understandings of regulatory regimes by
drawing attention to empty spaces, gaps, and overlaps in regulatory processes.
The idea of boundary objects was first developed by Susan Leigh Star and
James Griesemer in their historical study of the groups working at the Berke-
ley Museum of Vertebrate Biology, where amateur collectors, professional
scientists, philanthropists and administrators managed to collaborate produc-
tively in the absence of consensus.83 Leigh Star and Griesemer analysed the
role of objects, and, in particular, standardised specimen records:
Records of the specimens had different meanings for the different groups of
actors, but each group could contribute to and use these records. The practices
of each of the groups could continue intact, but the groups interacted via
record-keeping.84
To function successfully as a boundary object and act as a bridge between
social groups, an entity has to be sufﬁciently ﬂexible to serve the interests
of each group yet robust enough to maintain its identity in different social
contexts. The concept of boundary object has been widely used within STS,
but also criticised for a lack of precision (can anything be a boundary
object?). However, in the regulatory context it directs analytic attention
towards the sharing of procedures and entities, rather than understandings
and values. Consideration of the speciﬁc groups that use particular boundary
objects, and the different ways in which they understand these objects can also
be one way of drawing attention to the marginalisation of publics’ partici-
pation in health research and disregard of their concerns. For example,
since they are relatively stable in form and used by different groups within
research, consent forms can be understood as boundary objects. By asking
about their use, a study of consent forms could be used to investigate what
different groups understand by participation in particular biomedical research
projects, and whether processes of obtaining consent addresses their concerns
about the research and its outputs.
81Not to be confused with ‘bounded objects’ as discussed in previous sections referring to legal categories
created for regulatory purposes such as ‘human tissue’ and ‘personal data’.
82Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (Blackwell, 2004); Susan Leigh Star,
‘This is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Origin of a Concept’ (2010) 35 Science, Technology &
Human Values 601.
83Leigh Star and Griesemer (n 76).
84Sismondo (n 82) 148.
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As Leigh Star points out, interpretive flexibility is not unique to boundary
objects, and their organisational structure and scale also need to be con-
sidered: if boundary objects are used very consistently at a larger scale, they
turn into new entities such as infrastructures or standards.85 There has
been an increasing interest in the creation and maintenance of standards by
means of entities such as patient records,86 definitions of obesity and over-
weight using body mass index categories,87 and international classifications
of disease.88 A liminal approach complements this scholarship because it
highlights the effects of rigid or static classificatory systems in the fluid con-
texts of biomedical research and regulation. Consider again the example of
hESC research, where ‘standardization [was used] to stabilize human embryo-
nic stem cells (hESCs) as biological objects and in building the stem cell field
itself’.89
The second concept is boundary work. In outlining constructivist
approaches to the study of science, historian of science, Thomas Gieryn,
developed an influential metaphor to describe how:
[t]he boundaries of science are episodically established sustained, enlarged,
policed, breached, and sometimes erased in the defense, pursuit, or denial of
claims of epistemic authority. As knowledge makers seek to present their
claims or practices as legitimate (credible, trustworthy, reliable) by locating
them within ‘science,’ they discursively construct for it an ever changing
arrangement of boundaries and territories and landmarks, always contingent
on immediate circumstances.90
Gieryn labels the activities involved in building, maintaining, adapting and
policing these discursive perimeters ‘boundary-work’ which takes place ‘as
people contend for, legitimate, or challenge the cognitive authority of
science’.91 Such tasks are fundamental to the credibility of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge. Debates about the credibility of a particular scientist or areas of scientiﬁc
research are usually based on norms of scientiﬁc explanation (does a phenom-
enon contradict current models and theories?), scientiﬁc practice (is a process
replicable?) or behaviour (is a researcher acting from ﬁnancial or political
motives?). Flexible interpretation of such norms provides endless rhetorical
possibilities, depending on speciﬁc context and purpose. A contemporary
example of the shifting boundaries between science and non-science is
85Leigh Star (n 82) 602.
86Stefan Timmermans and Marc Berg, The Gold Standard: The Challenge of Evidence-based Medicine and
Standardization in Health Care (Temple University Press, 2003).
87Isabel Fletcher, ‘Defining an Epidemic: The Body Mass Index in British and US Obesity Research 1960–
2000’ (2014) 36 Sociology of Health and Illness 338.
88Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences (MIT Press,
1999).
89Eriksson and Webster (n 73) 72.
90Gieryn (n 77) xi.
91Ibid, 405.
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provided by the deﬁnition of complementary and alternative medicine: homo-
eopathy and herbalism are interesting contrasting examples here. The under-
lying mechanisms of homeopathy are now dismissed as scientiﬁcally
implausible, whereas pharmaceutical research investigates the physiological
effects of phytochemicals and uses them as the basis of new drugs such as arte-
mesinin compounds to treat malaria.
The concept of boundary work has been used to understand the use of
research evidence in regulatory processes. Sheila Jasanoff argues that advisory
(or policy-orientated or regulatory) science is ‘a hybrid activity that combines
elements of scientific evidence and reasoning with large doses of social and
political judgement.’92 Boundary work is central to this understanding of
the interaction between scientific expertise and policymaking. In her case
studies, Jasanoff demonstrates how, in order to exempt ‘technical’ matters
from political control, expert scientists define the boundary between science
and policy:
By drawing seemingly sharp boundaries between science and policy, scientists
in effect post ‘keep out’ signs to prevent non-scientists from challenging or rein-
terpreting claims labelled as ‘science’. The creation of such boundaries seems
crucial to the political acceptability of advice. When the boundary holds,
both regulators and the public accepts the experts’ designation as controlling,
and the recommendations of advisory committees, whatever their content,
are invested with unshakeable authority.93
However, this fluid boundary can also be used by expert scientists to define
the limits of their authority and avoid their recommendations becoming pol-
itically controversial. For example, scientific advice about the relationship
between diet and health has often been highly charged due to the operation
of extensive commercial interests in this area and the potentially wide-
ranging political implications of public health policy. Researchers serving
on expert committees in this field use wider or narrower definitions of
obesity science (and therefore their expertise) depending, for example, on
whether they are trying to explain rising rates of excess body weights, or
offer politically palatable solutions to the problem.94 The pervasiveness of
boundary work suggests that fluidity is an inherent aspect of recourse to scien-
tific expertise –who counts as an expert and whether the issue is primarily one
of science or, for example, ethics are often contested points. It also suggests
that in certain contexts regulatory actors will make use of fluidity if it is avail-
able to them.
92Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Harvard University Press, 1990) 299;
see also Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Prin-
ceton University Press, 2005).
93Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch (n 92) 236.
94Isabel Fletcher, ‘Obesity: A Historical Account of The Construction of a Modern Epidemic’ (PhD thesis,
University of Edinburgh 2012).
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As outlined above, many uses of the concept of liminality focus on the pro-
cessual, transformative experiences that take place in-between boundaries and
thresholds. Here, liminality is often understood as occurring at the edges or
margins of particular places and times.95 However, when analysing regulatory
processes, a focus on margins is not very helpful. In this section, we have pre-
sented an alternative, and complementary approach that understands limin-
ality as centrally concerned with movement across boundaries and thresholds.
Mapping these changing boundaries – between science and non-science – and
the objects – such as patient record or consent forms – that move across them,
can therefore be used to highlight gaps in regulatory regimes. These include
the unregulated spaces created by experimental treatments and new
medical technologies, the empty spaces where regulatory regimes have histori-
cally been weak, and overlaps where entities, such as reproductive tissues, are
subject to more than one form of regulation. Bringing cartographic
approaches from STS (and other disciplines) into dialogue with liminality
thus allows for a comprehensive and illuminating spatially-informed analysis
of particular regulatory regimes.
5.2. Temporality and being(s)
In this section we return to questions of temporality, using two examples to
illustrate how regulatory compression engenders research in ways that
might hinder research and fail to attend to the interests of research partici-
pants and/or marginalise publics’ participation both in research and in its
regulation. These two examples are the governance of emerging technologies
and the concept of social value as an ethical requirement for health research.
Both examples illustrate how the temporal rigidity of existing regulatory
mechanisms constrain the values and voices that are critical to successful
governance.
5.2.1. Precautionary principle
Emerging technologies require the creation of ‘possible products’ and ‘poss-
ible futures’ for their funding and their regulation. These may or may not
materialise. Regulation and governance, however, depend on the creation of
these potential products and the potential (positive and negative) futures
associated with them. Much governance in this context is not, however,
about regulating entities but rather their potential, constantly creating and
re-creating the spaces between and across disciplines, as well as the purview
and limits of associated regulation. As new, empty spaces are created, we
are constantly faced with an urge to contain and control the unknown
(since that is what regulation often implies). This can be seen, for example,
95Thomassen (n 32) 8.
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in current discussions surrounding gene editing.96 Questions in this area
range from, ‘Are any new social, ethical, or legal concerns raised by gene
editing?’, and ‘If so, is a precautionary form of regulation required?’, to
‘What is the object of regulation – a risk, a product?’ Alternatively, is this
merely another emerging technology that can, or should be, compressed to
‘fit’ within existing regulatory frameworks? We suggest that this is another
instance of a liminal space being created cotemporaneously with the uncer-
tainties generated by new and emerging technologies. Liminality suggests
that there is an urgent need for someone (or something – perhaps some
form of regulation) to lead us through.
Risk-based evaluation is often a predominant feature of such empty liminal
spaces. Interestingly, however, such spaces raise important ethical questions
as they become sites for battles of power, for example, between environmen-
talists and the industries they oppose,97 as well as battles of values. The pre-
cautionary principle, or more generally the idea of precaution, is one such
example. It assumes two things: that the status quo is good and the future
is risky; and that caution is a virtue and the potential problems lie with chan-
ging the status quo.98 On the one hand, such spaces can become the site for a
democratic process (or at least for an important involvement of publics), but
on the other hand, power can also quickly shift into techno-scientific and
regulatory hands by trying to contain the values created in these spaces by
‘science’-based value judgments, e.g. by containing fear, hope, power and
accountability within the seemingly value-neutral territory of risk and prob-
ability and into the hands of ‘experts’. An appeal to the precautionary prin-
ciple might initially appear to include the anxieties of concerned publics,
but in fact its regulatory expression (its dependence on risk-expertise and cal-
culations) might serve to further alienate publics, leading rather to regulatory
compression, as we have suggested above. Calls to use the precautionary prin-
ciple for new technologies,99 and lately, a call for a moratorium for gene
editing,100 have an apparent purpose of addressing the values of publics,
without necessarily ceding the power from the hands of ‘experts’. As a
result, these liminal spaces are kept strictly within the remit of science and
regulation, allowing tools such as the precautionary principle to become pol-
itical tools rather than tools of democratically-informed governance. The rest
96Rosario Isasi, Erika Kleiderman and Bartha Knoppers, ‘Editing Policy to Fit the Genome?’ (2016) 351
Science 337.
97Andrew Stirling, ‘Risk, Precaution and Science: Towards a More Constructive Policy Debate’ (2007) 8
EMBO Reports 309.
98Christian Munthe, ‘Precautionary Principle’ in Henk ten Have (ed), Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics
(Springer, 2015) 1–10.
99See International Bioethics Committee, ‘Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reflection on the Human
Genome and Human Rights’ (2 October 2015) 28 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002332/
233258E.pdf (accessed 26 January 2015).
100Ibid.
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becomes a matter of public perception and public engagement. It need not be
thus. Liminality invokes a realm of possibility, but equally because of inherent
uncertainties, the liminal space can be open to misuse and abuse.
5.2.2. Social value
A second and final example of the tension between the temporal limitations
stemming from existing regulatory mechanisms – and the ideal ethical
values that we wish to see represented in science and scientific governance
– is illustrated by the contemporary bioethical debate surrounding ‘social
value’ in research.101 Although not a new concept in bioethics, the concept
of social value seems to have gained some traction lately as part of the
ethical evaluation of research (especially clinical research) and of specific
research protocols. On the one hand, social value, referred to as ‘the prospect
of generating the knowledge and/or the means necessary to protect and
promote people’s health’102 is meant to act as a primary ethical justification
for research.103 Under this reading, social value acts as a ‘threshold device’,
a mechanism of transition for the research proposal, purporting to transform
the research question or design into something worthwhile, with other ethical
considerations following. If research does lead to something of value, the
question remains at which point the results of research become valuable.104
While it may be possible to establish some objective accounts as to what
counts as valuable, and value will constantly be created and redefined as
research progresses, the required feedback loops are often not present in
current governance structures, which as noted above are often ‘fixed and con-
sequently binding’. This, once again, is a liminal and thus processual
enterprise.
The process of ethics review is an example of rigidity within the governance
structure, in which the concept of social value remains trapped within an
institutionally delineated time-space both temporally (as part of ethics
approval prior to the commencement of a clinical study, for example), and
also discursively (within the discussion of risk assessment). This might be
seen as a form of permanent liminality – where uncertainties and anti-struc-
tures prevail. More importantly, as an analytical tool, liminality leads us to
question the very role of social value in all of this. Arguably, the demands
of social value ask us to never leave this feedback loop; to constantly revisit,
question and appraise both what might be considered valuable or not, and
101This section builds on a forthcoming paper, currently under review. See Agomoni Ganguli Mitra and
others, ‘Reconfiguring Social Value in Health Research through the Lens of Liminality’ (forthcoming).
102Revision of CIOMS 2002 International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Sub-
jects, ‘Guideline 1: Social Value’ http://www.cioms.ch/index.php/guideline-1 (accessed 26 January 2016).
103Danielle Wenner, ‘The Social Value of Knowledge and International Clinical Research’ (2015) 15 Devel-
oping World Bioethics 76.
104Michelle Habets, Johannes van Delden and Annelien Bredenoord, ‘The Social Value of Clinical Research’
(2014) 15 BMC Medical Ethics 66.
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to revisit our standards of what is seen as valuable. Once we realise this, we
might look for alternative approaches. For example, the creation of more flex-
ible and reflexive governance practices, with feedback loops and iterative
forms of collaborative knowledge production regulation, may thus allow us
to unleash the potential of ‘social value’ as a concept.
6. Conclusion
We began this article by outlining current approaches to health research regu-
lation. We offered the term ‘regulatory compression’ to characterise the effects
of these approaches on research practices. With its focus on transformation
and the ‘in-between’, liminality allows us to see how extant regulatory frame-
works rely on a silo-based approach to classifying research objects that: (1)
limits the flexibility necessary in clinical and laboratory research; (2) results
in the emergence of unregulated spaces that lie between the bounded regulat-
ory spheres; and (3) curtails modes of public participation in the health
research enterprise. As a concept, liminality sheds new light on the bound-
ary-crossing inherent to health research and thus calls for a radical reimagin-
ing of regulatory approaches. Going forward, we suggest there is a need to
develop the notion of processual regulation. This is far more than a mere
focus on processes in regulation. Rather, as outlined above, such an approach
requires a temporal-spatial examination of regulatory spaces and practices as
these are experienced by all actors, including the relationship of actors with
the objects of regulation. In particular, we suggest that processual-oriented
regulation has the following features:
. Over time, it recognises the flexibility and fluidity inherent in laboratory
and clinical research;
. In space, it focuses on iterative interactions that adapt with new develop-
ments in science and medicine, as well as with changes in law and regu-
lation; and
. Through experience, it reflects the complete investigative endeavour and is
able, for example, to guide the different involved parties through the entire
research process.
There are a number of questions that will need to be answered when
designing a processual-oriented mode of regulation. Questions that we can
identify at present include:
. How can a regulatory system that recognises flexibility also demonstrate its
trustworthiness to researchers and research participants alike?
. How does processual regulation dovetail with the common commitment to
deliver proportionate regulation; that is, would such an approach increase
or decrease the bureaucratic labour involved in health research?
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. Who gets to decide what constitutes ‘the entire research process’, and how?
The premise of this article is that much is lost in current regulatory
approaches for the failure to recognise and acknowledge a reality of human
experience: that liminality is all around us and experienced on a daily basis.
We have demonstrated the applicability of liminality to the health research
enterprise in a number of contexts and we have developed a sophisticated
conceptual toolkit in the process. Our core contribution has been to suggest
that the liminal regulatory spaces that already exist are under-theorised and
are operating sub-optimally for the want of the insights that liminality can
bring. The reality is that liminal spaces exist everywhere. We encourage the
reader to draw on our analysis to recognise these in myriad contexts and to
deploy corollary perspectives in navigating all such spaces that emerge ‘in-
between’.
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